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In a seminal paper, Lin and Reiter introduced the progres-
sion of basic action theories in the situation calculus. In this
paper, we study the progression of knowledge in multiagent
settings, where after actions, an agent updates her beliefs but
also updates what she believes other agents know given what
has occurred. By appealing to the notion of only knowing,
we are able to avoid limitations of earlier work on multiagent
progression, and obtain a new general account: we show that
after an action, knowledge bases are updated in a Lin and Re-
iter fashion at every nesting of modalities. Consequently, re-
cent results on the first-order definability of progression carry
over to a multiagent setting without too much effort.
Introduction
Long-lived agents, such as autonomous robots, have to op-
erate purposefully after thousands of actions. As argued in
(Reiter 2001), there is only one computational methodology
that addresses this problem at large: the idea of progressing
the current world state, investigated in a general way for the
language of the situation calculus in (Lin and Reiter 1997).
Indeed, applying repeated regression over so many actions
would simply not be feasible. STRIPS technology is a sim-
ple form of progression, Lin and Reiter (LR) observe, but in
an open-world setting with non-trivial action types, appeal-
ing to second-order logic is necessary (Vassos and Levesque
2008). Nonetheless, LR identified two simple cases where
progression is first-order definable, and other companion re-
sults have been identified since (Liu and Lakemeyer 2009).
However, LR did not consider knowledge. The progres-
sion of epistemic theories is very easily motivated in a world
where the agent can both act and sense, and the agent would
deliberate on her actions based on what she knows and does
not know. An equally compelling case for the progression of
knowledge is in multiagent settings, such as the ones robots
would inhabit. Here, it is reasonable that after actions, for
computational reasons among others, an agent updates her
beliefs but also updates her beliefs about what others know
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Figure 1: Agents a and b look for a room with gold.
given that these actions have occurred.1 Imagine, for exam-
ple, a simple domain, involving agents a and b looking for
gold (Figure 1). When a observes b moving to Room 2 and
looking through its window, her beliefs would be as follows:
• she still does not know where the gold is;
• a knows that b knows whether Room 2 has the gold, but
cannot say what b now knows.
In general, then, progression should say precisely how a’s
knowledge and a’s beliefs about b’s knowledge would be
updated after any sequence of physical and sensing actions.2
The progression of knowledge in the single agent case
is considered in (Liu and Wen 2011), but under syntac-
tic restrictions to the initial theory, such as limitations on
quantifying-in, and that knowledge does not appear nega-
tively. The progression of knowledge is also considered in
(Lakemeyer and Levesque 2009). The results here are gen-
eral. By appealing to Levesque’s (1990) logic of only know-
ing, they obtain a simple specification: given an agent who
only knows an action theory, the result of doing an action is
that the agent only knows the LR progression of this theory.
The progression of knowledge in the multiagent case is
also considered in (Liu and Wen 2011). In addition to the
above limitations, formulas such as Ki p, where p is objec-
tive, can be progressed, but not KiKjKi p. That is, among
other things, they cannot deal with an agent’s beliefs about
what others believe about her. In this work, we substantially
improve and extend these results. We provide a new gen-
eral account of the progression of knowledge in multiagent
systems that is essentially equivalent to the results in (Lake-
meyer and Levesque 2009) when only a single agent is con-
cerned. As a simple consequence of this work, earlier ad-
vances on tractable progression apply easily to our results.
1We use the terms “knowledge” and “belief” interchangeably,
and never require that knowledge needs to be true in the real world.
2For simplicity, executed actions are assumed to be publicly ob-
servable, even if the information that agents receive may be private
and unobservable.
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Logical Foundations
The language is a second-order modal dialect with equality,
and can be thought of as a situation-suppressed epistemic
version of Reiter’s (2001) situation calculus, as defined in
(Lakemeyer and Levesque 2009). We will not go over the
details here, except to note:
• the symbols of the language consist of first-order vari-
ables, second-order predicate variables, rigid functions,
fluent predicate symbols, as well as these connectives and
other symbols: =,∧,¬,∀,, epistemic modalities, paren-
theses, period, comma;
• the language includes a countably infinite supply of rigid
terms, which we denote R, that are taken to be isomorphic
to the domain of discourse;
• multiagent knowledge and only knowing: the language in-
cludes modalitiesKi andOi to reason about what i knows
as well as what i only knows;
• sensing: every action is assumed to have a binary sens-
ing result. After an action, the agent comes to know that
the action was executable (via a special symbol Poss), and
whether the corresponding sensing outcome holds (via a
special symbol SFi). For simplicity, we keep sensing ac-
tions separate from physical ones which only affect the
world but do not provide any knowledge to the agent.
A semantics is provided for well-formed formulas in this
language by means of possible worlds. Formally, let Z be
the set of all finite sequences of elements of R including 〈〉,
the empty sequence. Z should be understood as the set of
all finite sequences of actions. Then a world w ∈ W is any
function from G (the set of ground atoms) andZ to {0, 1}.
To interpret epistemic operators, and only knowing in par-
ticular, we appeal to the notion of k-structures (Belle and
Lakemeyer 2010). For ease of exposition, assume that there
are only 2 agents: a (Alice) and b (Bob); a generalization to
more agents is straightforward. Then,
Definition 1: A k-structure (k ≥ 1), say ek, for an agent is
defined inductively as:
− e1 ⊆ W × {{}},
− ek ⊆ W × Ek−1, where Em is the set of all m-structures.
Intuitively, a k-structure for a, denoted eka, determines what
a believes about the world, but also at each world, what a
believes b to know, to depth k − 1. Such an epistemic state
captures the initial beliefs of an agent, and of course, as the
agent acts and senses in the world, some possibilities would
be discarded. To enable this, we define w′ 'iz w (read: “i con-
siders w′ to agree with w on the sensing results throughout
action sequence z”) inductively by the following:
• w′ '〈〉 w for all w′;
• w′ 'iz·t w iff w′ 'iz w,
w′[Poss(t), z] = 1 and w′[SFi(t), z] = w[SFi(t), z].
Putting all these together, we now turn to the semantic rules
for sentences of the logic. These will be defined wrt a world
w, an action sequence z, a variable map µ to interpret quan-
tification over second-order variables (see (Lakemeyer and
Levesque 2009)) a structure of some depth for a, say eka, and
a structure of some depth for b, say elb.
3 The rules for the
formulas in the language are given inductively, as usual. The
cases for formulas not mentioning epistemic operators is as
discussed in (Lakemeyer and Levesque 2009). For epistemic
operators, we use the following definition:
Definition 2: Let w be a world, eki a k-structure and z any
sequence of actions. Then:
• wz is a world such that wz[p, z′] = w[p, z·z′] for all ground
atoms p and action sequences z′;
• (eki )wz is defined inductively:
– (e1i )
w







z ) | (w′, ek−1j ) ∈ eki and w′ 'iz w
}
.
Here, wz is exactly like w after z. Thus, it is intuitive to think
of wz as the progression of w wrt z, and analogously, (eki )
w
z is
the progression of eki wrt z given the (real) world w. Indeed,
when we progress the structures in eki we are insisting that
only those worlds which are compatible with w are consid-
ered.4 Then, the rules for epistemic operators are as follows:
• eka, elb,w, z, µ |=Kaα iff for all w′, for all ek−1 for b,
if (w′, ek−1b ) ∈ (eka)wz then (eka)wz , ek−1b ,w′, 〈〉, µ |= α;
• eka, elb,w, z, µ |= Oaα iff for all w′, for all ek−1 for b,
(w′, ek−1b ) ∈ (eka)wz iff (eka)wz , ek−1b ,w′, 〈〉, µ |= α.
The semantics forKb andOb is defined analogously.
Roughly speaking, then, i is said to know α after z at w iff
all the structures in i’s progressed epistemic state wrt (w, z)
are those where α holds initially. Analogously, α is said to
be only known after z at w if structures where α holds are
precisely the ones in the progressed epistemic state.5
We say a sentence α is satisfiable if there is a model of
“appropriate” depth where α is true (Belle and Lakemeyer
2010). We say α is valid, written |= α, with the understand-
ing that α is true wrt all models of the appropriate depth.6
Finally, the usual properties on introspection can be
shown to hold for all action sequences. That is, both
(Kiα ⊃ KiKiα) and (¬Kiα ⊃ Ki¬Kiα) are valid. Of
course, from only knowing (Levesque 1990), we also get
knowledge, that is, (Oiα ⊃Kiα) is valid.
3The idea is that only formulas with some number of epistemic
operators are interpreted wrt structures of a corresponding depth;
see (Belle and Lakemeyer 2010) on how to make this precise.
4We remark that when constructing (eki )
w
z , we use worlds w
′ that
are compatible with w wrt i’s sensing results, but then we progress
the structures ek−1j that i considers possible for j at w
′ as if w′ is the
real world to obtain (ek−1j )
w′
z . The reason is that i simply does not
know which world is the real one, and so at each of her possible
worlds w′, she would “progress” her version of j’s epistemic state
using w′ instead of w.
5The difference between the rules for Kiα and Oiα is the “if”
in the second line of the former vs. “iff” in the latter.
6In particular, it is possible to show that if a sentence is satisfi-
able wrt every model of the appropriate depth, it is also satisfiable
wrt every model of higher depths (Belle and Lakemeyer 2010).
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Basic Action Theories
We now consider the equivalent of Reiter’s action theories,
the components of which we illustrate using an example:7
Example 3: We develop a simple basic action theory for
the gold domain in Figure 1, where the gold is to be found
in either r1 (Room 1) or r2 (Room 2). We imagine a single
physical action mv(x, y) which gets the agent x to Room y,
and a single sensing action see(x, y) which allows the agent
x to see through Room y’s window and the action reports
whether the gold is present. We also use a fluent Gold(x) to
say that Room x has the gold, and a fluent At(x, y) to indicate
that the agent x is at Room y. More precisely, the basic action
theory we are imagining has the following components:
1. Poss(o) ≡ ∃x, y. o = see(x, y) ∧ At(x, y) ∨
o = mv(x, y) ∧ true.
2. [o]Gold(x) ≡ Gold(x).
3. [o]At(x, y) ≡ o = mv(x, y) ∨
At(x, y) ∧ ¬∃u(o = mv(x, u)).
4. SFa(o) ≡ ∃x, y. o = see(x, y) ∧ x = a ∧ Gold(y) ∨
o = see(x, y) ∧ x , a ∧ true.
5. SFb(o) ≡ ∃x, y. o = see(x, y) ∧ x = b ∧ Gold(y) ∨
o = see(x, y) ∧ x , b ∧ true.
Item 1 is a precondition axiom, items 2 and 3 are successor
state axioms, and the remaining are sensing axioms. These
latter axioms say this: if x is at y then its sensor would return
true if y has the gold, and false otherwise. We assume that
actions are always public in this work, and so we also need
to describe what i learns when he senses j looking through
the window. It is this definition that eventually leads to in-
formation asymmetry; here, we want that i does not obtain
new knowledge on j’s sensing. For example, SFa will simply
be true when see(b, r1) is performed.
Finally, we want to also say that the gold is in Room 1,
and so for an initial theory, we will have KB0 = Gold(r1).
Moreover, to say that the agents do not know where the gold
is, let KB denote the conjunction of: Gold(r1) ∨ Gold(r2),
Gold(r1) ≡ ¬Gold(r2), and ∀x, y¬At(x, y). Then, lumping
items 1-5 from the example as β, the following sentence:
KB0 ∧Oa(KB ∧ β ∧Ob(KB ∧ β)) (1)
is a domain where Room 1 has the gold, a does not know
where the gold is, and believes the same of b. In contrast,
(1)∧Ob(KB0 ∧β) is a domain where, in fact, b does know
where the gold is located and so, a has false beliefs about b.
Let us conclude the section with some entailments which
will guide us when accounting for progression.
Proposition 4: The following are entailed by (1):
1. [mv(b, r2)][see(b, r2)]¬∃xKa(Gold(x));
2. [mv(b, r2)][see(b, r2)]Ka∃xKb(Gold(x));
3. [mv(b, r2)][see(b, r2)][mv(a, r1)][see(a, r1)]
(KaGold(r1) ∧KaKbGold(r1)).
7See (Lakemeyer and Levesque 2009) for the general definition.
Most significantly, since situation terms do not appear in the lan-
guage, Reiter’s (2001) second-order induction axiom, among other
things, will not be needed, but the remaining parts of an action the-
ory have an equivalent formulation.
Progression
In this section, we turn to the main results of this paper. The
question we would like to ask is this: suppose agents are
given basic action theories as their initial knowledge bases,
how are we to characterize the knowledge bases after an ac-
tion is performed? Only knowing will give us the answer.
What we desire for a progression theorem are transforma-
tions obeying the following properties:
1. a general characterization of the new knowledge bases re-
gardless of the syntactic restrictions to action types;
2. progression must be allowed to iterate.
We present results supporting this desiderata for a fragment
of the language referred to as progressable sentences:
Definition 5: A Ocnf formula is any conjunction of formu-
las of the form φ∨Oiψ, where ψ is any formula and φ is any
fluent formula.
Definition 6: We define progressable sentences of depth k ≥
1 inductively as follows:
• i-progressable and j-progressable sentences of depth 1
are basic action theories;
• a i-progressable sentence of depth k > 1 is the conjunc-
tion of any basic action theory Σ and a Ocnf formula∧
(φ ∨ Ojψ), where each ψ is a j-progressable sentence
of depth < k;
• a j-progressable sentence of depth k > 1 is the conjunc-
tion of any basic action theory Σ and a Ocnf formula∧
(φ ∨ Oiψ), where each ψ is a i-progressable sentence
of depth < k.
If α is a i-progressable sentence (of any depth) then Oiα is
referred to a progressable sentence. If α is a j-progressable
sentence (of any depth) thenOjα is referred to as a progress-
able sentence.
Roughly, progressable sentences are those where i’s beliefs
about the world are precisely determined by an action theory,
and i has beliefs about possible knowledge bases that j only
knows.8 Clearly, (1) would be classified as progressable, as
would a sentence of the formOa(φ ∧ β ∧ (ϕ ⊃ Obψ ∧ ϕ′ ⊃
Obψ
′)) where, by requirement, ψ and ψ′ are b-progressable,
and thus, perhaps action theories themselves.
Progression for Physical Actions In the following we as-
sume pi to refer to the RHS of the precondition axioms, and
γF to refer to the RHS of successor state axioms. Also, let α
~F
~P
denote the formula α with every occurrence of fluent pred-
icate symbols Fi replaced by second-order variables Pi of
the same arity. The first main result is a characterization, in
general terms, of what is known after a physical action.9
8Note that, then, the single agent case is essentially identical to
(Lakemeyer and Levesque 2009).
9To avoid notational clutter, we make two simplifying assump-
tions: (a) we state theorems for progressable sentences of depth 2,
and (b) we assume that the dynamic components β are the same
at all depths. Generalizing these is straightforward but tedious.
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Theorem 7: Suppose Υ = Oi(φ ∧ β ∧ ∧(ϕu ∨ Oj(ψu ∧
β))), where u ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is a progressable theory, where
φ, ϕu and ψu are fluent sentences and β are the dynamic
components. Suppose t is a physical action. Then:
|= Υ ⊃ [t]Oi(Pφ ∧ β ∧
∧
(ϕu ∨Oj(Pψu ∧ β)))
where for a fluent formula α:
Pα = ∃~P. [(α ∧ piot ) ~F~P ∧
∧
∀~x. F(~x) ≡ γF ot ~F~P].
This theorem says that, at all depths, if all that i knows is
a basic action theory, then after an action, he knows another
basic action theory where the knowledge base is the progres-
sion of the previous initial knowledge base. The resulting
theory is still progressable, and so progression can iterate.
On the correctness of belief expansion, we have:
Theorem 8: Suppose Υ is as above. Then
Υ |= [t]Kiα iff Υ′ |=Kiα
where Υ′ is the new progressed theory from Theorem 7.
This result says that whatever is believed by the progressed
theory is equivalently believed after t from the initial knowl-
edge base. That is, the two theories agree on the future.
Example 9: Consider the effect of mv(b, r2) on the progress-
able theory (1). From Theorem 7, we have:
|= (1) ⊃ [mv(b, r2)]Oa(PKB ∧ β ∧Ob(PKB ∧ β))
where PKB can be shown to be equivalent to {Gold(r1) ∨
Gold(r2),Gold(r1) ≡ ¬Gold(r2),At(b, r2),∀x, y. x , b ⊃
¬At(x, y)}. Then, readers may note that the following sen-
tences are entailed by Oa(PKB ∧ β ∧ Ob(PKB ∧ β)):
KaAt(b, r2),KaKbAt(b, r2) andKaKb¬At(a, r2).
Finally, we remark that Pφ for any initial theory φ is essen-
tially the second-order account of progression given by LR;
see (Lakemeyer and Levesque 2009) for discussions.
From this general definition, standard progression results
on first-order definability (Liu and Lakemeyer 2009) apply
in a straightforward manner. For example, we have:
Theorem 10: Suppose Υ is as above, where φ and ψu are
first-order formulas. If Υ is local-effect, then Pφ and Pψu
from Theorem 7 are definable as first-order formulas.
See (Liu and Lakemeyer 2009) for a definition of local-effect
action theories; analogously, first-order progression for other
classes of actions carry over without too much effort. See a
long version of this paper for details.
Progression for Sensing Actions Letting θi refer to the
RHS of SFi in a basic action theory, we have the second main
result of this paper:
Theorem 11: Suppose Υ = Oi(φ∧β∧∧(ϕu∨Oj(ψu∧β))),
where u ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is a progressable theory as before. Sup-
pose t is a sensing action. Then,
|= Υ ⊃
(SFi(t) ⊃ [t]Oi(φ ∧ piot ∧ θiot ∧ β ∧
∧
(ϕu ∨ Ψu))) ∧
(¬SFi(t) ⊃ [t]Oi(φ ∧ piot ∧ ¬θiot ∧ β ∧
∧
(ϕu ∨ Ψu)))
where Ψu is the following sentence:
θj
o
t ⊃ Oj(ψu ∧ piot ∧ θjot ∧ β) ∧¬θjot ⊃ Oj(ψu ∧ piot ∧ ¬θjot ∧ β).
This theorem says that after a sensing action, what i learns
for herself is contingent on the outcome of SFi(t). But as far
as i’s beliefs about j goes, she is uncertain about the outcome
of sensing for j, and so her beliefs about j would differ at one
place: θjot vs. ¬θjot . Let us illustrate this using an example:
Example 12: Consider the progression of the theory from
Example 9 wrt the sensing action see(b, r2), denoted t. Let ζ
denote PKB from that example, and so for an initial theory,
we haveΥ = Gold(r1)∧Oa(ζ∧β∧Ob(ζ∧β)).After t, from
Theorem 11 we have Υ |= SFa(t) ⊃ [t]Oa(ζ∗ ∧ β ∧ θbot ⊃
Ob(ζ′ ∧ β) ∧ ¬θbot ⊃ Ob(ζ′′ ∧ β)) because SFa(t) is true,
and where ζ∗ = ζ ∧ piot ∧ θaot , which is equivalent to ζ; ζ′ =
ζ∧piot ∧θbot , where θbot is ∃x, y. (t = see(x, y)∧x = b∧Gold(y)∨
(t = see(x, y)∧ x , b)), which is equivalent to Gold(r2); and
ζ′′ = ζ ∧ piot ∧ ¬θbot . Thus, ζ′ is equivalent to ζ ∧ Gold(r2)
and ζ′′ is equivalent to ζ ∧ ¬Gold(r2). Thus, a now knows
that b knows whether Room 2 has the gold. Formally, the
progressed theory can be shown to entailKa(KbGold(r2) ∨
Kb¬Gold(r2)),Ka∃xKbGold(x), and ¬∃xKaKbGold(x).
Example 13: As a final example on progression, consider
the sentence KB0 ∧Oa(KB ∧ β ∧Ob(KB ∧ β ∧Oa(KB ∧
β))). Its progression wrt mv(b, r2) · see(b, r2) simplifies to:
Oa(ζ ∧ β ∧
(Gold(r2) ⊃ Ob(ζ ∧ Gold(r2) ∧ β ∧Oa(ζ ∧ β))) ∧
(¬Gold(r2) ⊃ Ob(ζ ∧ ¬Gold(r2) ∧ β ∧Oa(ζ ∧ β))))
where ζ is from the previous example. The new knowledge
base entailsKaKbKaAt(b, r2) andKaKb¬∃xKaGold(x).
Conclusions
We obtained new general results on the progression of
knowledge in multiagent systems that substantially extended
previous work: we showed that given any action theory,
knowledge bases at all depths can be progressed in a LR
fashion after actions. For the future, we would like to con-
sider private actions, and go beyond Ocnf formulas.
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